it was an institutional feature of the Unitary Kingdom of the Netherlands, from which the Belgians had seceded (Bécane in Mastias and Grange 1987: 367; De Schepper 1990: 16-31 ).
In the societal context, the constitution had, admittedly, abolished class distinctions, but in reality the population was composed of several strata on top of which were the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. The National Congress rejected the British model of a hereditary aristocratic upper chamber, but as a result of the elevated levy condition the aristocracy was well represented in the newly elected Senate (Luyckx and Platel 1985, 5-6) . From a political perspective, the Senate was the result of a compromise between progressive forces and more conservative ones. Belgium was not unique in this respect: the transition to liberal democracy in the nineteenth century was a key moment for bicameralism (Mastias and Grange 1987: 44-45) , a lubricant for helping the old elite to accept the assumption of power by a new political class (Bécane in Mastias and Grange 1987: 151) . In Belgium, another argument played a part: to gain international recognition a conservative touch was important to reassure the Great Powers (Alen 1992: 439-440; Stengers 1990: 11-12) .
Initially, the functions of the Belgian Senate were threefold. It was to serve as a counterpower for the political powers of the 'progressive' Chamber of Representatives, a forum for reflection, and it secured the representation of large landowners and aristocracy (Alen 1992: 441; Goossens 1983: 795) . These functions determined the Senate's composition and powers. Conditions of age and fortune secured the conservative element. I Symmetrical bicameralism, giving the Senate nearly the same powers as the Chamber of Representatives, made sure that its objections would not pass unnoticed.
As in other countries, the rise of democracy plunged the Senate into a crisis. The dilemma was that the upper chamber's role as protector of elite interests and institutional check on the quality of legislation presupposed specificity in composition, but deprived it of democratic legitimacy and therefore of authority (Mastias and Grangé 1987: 51-74) . In Belgium, the Senate evolved from specific but not legitimate into legitimate but not specific. In a first period, the aristocratic Senate played second fiddle; in a second period the Senate was gradually reformed to give it more legitimacy (Goossens 1983: 796) . The entrance of political parties and party discipline eliminated whatever specificity that remained, making the Senate redundant. In small unitary states such as Sweden, Denmark and Croatia, unicameralism was a reply to the dilemma of upper chambers (see Massicotte Nevertheless, the Senate was not reformed into a chamber of the sub-states. Instead, it was called a 'meeting point' between the federal authority and the sub-states -in Belgium:
the Communities and Regions. Moreover, the Senate was to maintain its function of a place for reflection. The Chamber of Representatives was to be the assembly for the daily legislative work, and the exclusive political chamber. The Senate was deprived of the power to control the Government. The result was a hybrid chamber, complex in its composition and powers.
The Senate was composed of four types of senators. The directly elected senators and the Community senators fulfilled the function of 'meeting room': the first were to represent the federal interests, the latter, appointed by the Community Parliaments from within their members, the regional interests. The co-opted senators, appointed by the former categories, were to bring in specific expertise for the reflective function. The last category was a throwback to the past: the King's children were senators by right. Except for the last category, the Senators, as the MPs in the Chamber of Representatives, were divided in two language groups, French and Dutch. The German Community Senator, however, is not part of a language group. 
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In establishing parliamentary functions, three law making procedures were put in place.
According to the default procedure, the Chamber of Representatives became the dominant legislative assembly. In its role as a chamber of reflection, the Senate could decide whether to discuss a bill adopted by the Chamber of Representatives, and it retained the right of initiative. It could, however, only suggest amendments; the Chamber had the final say. For specific matters, listed in Art. 77 of the Constitution, the Chamber and the Senate remained symmetrical, implying that every bill had to be adopted by both. These were mostly matters linked to the institutional design of the federal state, in line with the Senate's function as 'meeting place'. Finally, Article 74 of the Constitution listed four types of laws in which the Senate had no say at all. These were laws that were closely linked to the Chamber's political function: the civil and criminal liability of the federal Ministers, the federal budget, the granting of naturalisation and the setting of army quotas.
Criticism, however, remained, as the Senate was unable to fulfil its functions. First, it did not perform as a meeting place, because the directly elected Senators outnumbered the Community Senators, 40 to 21. Moreover, Community Senators, appointed on the basis of the results of the federal elections, did not necessarily reflect the majority in the Community Parliament. In addition, the Regions were only indirectly represented, often without a seat for the Dutch-speaking representatives of the Brussels Region. The linguistic communities, on the other hand, were well represented through their language groups, but the Senate was redundant for this purpose, as the House was already divided into language groups. Second, the lack of specificity hindered the Senate in its function as a reflection room. The Chamber of Representatives and the Senate were still made up of the same political majorities, due to the fact that they were elected on the same day and the Community Senator's seats were allocated on the basis of federal election results.
Moreover, no guarantees were built in to avoid that co-option would become a second chance for failed election candidates rather than a mechanism to bring in specific expertise from people outside of the political domain. On top of that, the complexity of law making procedures created uncertainty, especially in respect of 'mixed' bills, containing matters allotted to different procedures.
Consequently, pleas for the abolishment of the Senate re-emerged. In a political agreement of 26 April 2002, it was ultimately decided not to abolish the Senate, but to reform it into a genuine 'chamber of the sub-states'; but it took another decade to actually reform the Senate in that way. E -222 linguistic borders, with mutual benefits for the Flemish and the French-speaking political parties. The first were able to gain seats in the federal Parliament for Flemish candidates in Brussels, as the votes in the Flemish districts Halle-Vilvoorde were added to the few Flemish votes in Brussels. The latter were able to reach out to the French-speaking voters residing in the Flemish districts. For that reason, however, the Flemish parties considered the district a symbol of French imperialism and requested the splitting of the district. As a compensation, the francophone candidates in Flemish municipalities and the Flemish candidates in Brussels could be considered for co-option to the Senate. In practice, the cooption system, as discussed before, gives failed candidates a second chance, irrespective of their home district.
Finally, gender quotas were introduced (Art. 67 § 3 Constitution). Gender quotas already applied to the lists of candidates for elections, raising the proportion of women in Parliament from 10 to almost 40 % (see Popelier and Lemmens 2015: 112-113) . As the category of directly elected Senators was removed, a system was put in place reserving one third of the seats for each gender. In 2014 this resulted in perfect gender parity, with a 50% representation of each sex. The question remains as to why this gender quota is deemed relevant for the Senate. The quota for the lists of candidates secures an equal starting position for men and women, by compensating for the alleged unconscious mechanisms that put women behind. Quotas for the actual seats, however, impact on the outcome rather than the starting position. The Senate is a chamber that is presumed to protect the interests of the sub-states, not women (or men) -especially since the Senate is not involved in the adoption of gender-related legislation.
Competences
While the Senate became a (more or less) genuine chamber of the sub-states, its powers, however, were drastically reduced. It is constructed as a non-permanent body (Art. E -223 of laws listed in Art. 78 of the Constitution, the Senate has the right to discuss bills approved by the Chamber of Representative and to propose amendments, but it has no right of initiative and the Chamber has the final say. These laws mainly concern institutional matters too, such as the procedure for the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and the prevention of discrimination on ideological and philosophical grounds -which, in Belgium, largely coincide with the linguistic fault lines -or the organisation of the Council of State or administrative courts.
Daily legislative work is handled by the Chamber of Representatives to the exclusion of the Senate. Even laws that fall under the rare category of shared powers are not listed under Art. 77 or 78 of the Constitution, and are therefore adopted without the Senate's involvement. Tax laws, for example, are concurrent matters, with priority for federal tax laws: sub-states have taxing powers, but they cannot tax matters that are already subjected to federal taxes, and federal laws can determine exceptions to regional taxes (Art. 170, § 2 Const.). The Senate does have a non-decisive say in laws that interfere in sub-state tax laws (Art. 78, § 2 Const.), though not in regular tax laws, although they determine the room that is left for regional taxes. Framework matters, for example regarding public procurement or consumer protection, are also outside the scope of the Senate's powers. The same goes for the few matters in which the federal legislature lays down the normative framework and the Regions have executive powers. For example, the normative framework regarding unemployment policy is a federal matter, but the Regions have the power to check whether the unemployed are available for work and if necessary to sanction them. Equally striking is that the Senate only has a limited say, through Art. 78 Constitution, in the organisation of the Council of State. Yet, the Council of State has important powers that also concern the sub-states: it can annul executive regulations and orders, and executives are under the obligation of submitting legislative bills and draft executive regulations to the Council for legal advice.
As to external relations, the Senate has been deprived of its privileged function.
Whereas the 1993 reform obliged the government to ask the Senate for approval before submitting a treaty to the Chamber of Representatives, the Senate no longer has any power in these matters. Its main function in external relations is to act as an intermediary for 
Conclusion
Two decades after Belgium was declared a federal state, the Senate has finally transformed into a House of the sub-states. This, however, has proven to be a disguise for the simultaneous dismantlement of bicameralism.
In its present form, the Senate comes to life mainly for constitutional revisions and at key moments in the transformation of the federal state structure. In between, it makes a pretence of purpose by producing well-elaborated study reports, called 'information reports', on federal issues that also have repercussions on the competences of the Communities or Regions (Art. 56 Constitution). Between 2014-2017, eight information reports were adopted on a variety of matters such as surrogate motherhood, gender equality, child poverty, and the implementation of EU law, resulting in recommendations for which follow-up is in no way guaranteed. In addition, in the same period, the Senate adopted one constitutional revision and two laws following the symmetrical bicameral procedure of Art. 77 Constitution, and it discussed (without proposing amendments) three out of 15 laws that came within the asymmetrical bicameral procedure of Art. 78
Constitution. Further, it adopted six amendments of the Senate's procedural rules, and eight non-binding resolutions. Meanwhile, the Chamber of Representatives adopted 511 laws and one constitutional revision.
Evidently, the gradual federalisation of Belgium is coupled with the simultaneous gradual dismantling of the Senate. This is puzzling, as federalism and bicameralism are usually a pair. The question, then, is why we observe these opposing movements at play.
The functions of Upper Houses in multi-tiered systems
Multi-tiered systems come in many forms. What they have in common, is that they deal with tensions between territorial sub-entities' claims for autonomy on the one hand, and on the other the concern for the state's integrity as a whole. In a dynamic approach to federalism, forms of state are no longer categorised by defining sets of institutional features. For example, bicameralism is one of several determinants but not a defining E -225 feature of federal systems; and confederal systems are not necessarily composed of sovereign states. Instead, multi-tiered systems are situated (and evolve) on a sliding scale based on parameters that measure the autonomy of the sub-states as well as the integrity of the federal state as a whole. Federal constructions aim at a balanced relation between diversity and integrity, whereas in so-called regionalised or quasi-federal states the concern for integrity gains the upper hand, and confederal systems primarily aim at securing subentities' autonomy (see further Popelier 2014:5-6).
Bicameralism has a clear purpose, wherever central decisions are adopted that impact upon the sub-entities: it allows sub-states to protect their interests (2.1.). Closely linked to this is the representation of sub-state's interests in external relations (2.2.). In more traditional federal states the idea of checks and balances is also part of an Upper House's rationale (2.3.). In multinational states, much revolves around multinational conflict management (2.4.). In essence, however, bicameralism is a device for federal systems that seek a balance between diversity and integrity, as the Upper House secures the interests of the sub-states through a collective veto right while committing them to the federal interest in daily legislative work. This is not necessarily considered the perfect solution in multitiered systems with a more pronounced emphasis on either integrity or diversity.
Territorial representation

Function
The most obvious function of Upper Houses is that of an institutional mechanism to voice the interests of sub-national entities. Bicameralism is a balanced solution to this end, . The drawback of the latter system is that bills are not systematically seen by regional parliaments. Also, this mechanism corresponds to a conflict model, whereas the involvement of the Senate takes place in a more harmonious model. Therefore, Upper Houses are better suited to balanced federal systems, whereas direct sub-state interference is more indicative of a confederal system.
Sub-state involvement in external matters
The entanglement of states in international or supranational networks impacts on the position of sub-states in federations, as sub-state competences are also exercised at the international and, in particular, the EU level. It is vital, then, for sub-states to be involved in international and supranational rule-making in matters that affect their competences. For parliaments, this concerns, amongst others, the approval of treaties, participation in the EU Early Warning System and the standpoint the executive is to take in the Council of 
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States can take three approaches: a centralist approach, a gate-keeper approach and a dual approach (see further Popelier 2014: 10-12). In the first approach, the central government is in control, which fits best in more regionalised multi-tiered systems. In the gate-keeper approach, the central government is the main point of contact, but sub-states are involved in the determination of the state's position. They have most impact when they act not in isolation but in unison with other sub-states. This is a more balanced approach, and therefore the most likely to be found in federal systems. Lastly, in a dual approach, sub-states have wide powers to establish external relations, including the right to conclude international agreements without the Federal Government's consent; they have direct representation within the Council of Ministers, and individual sub-states can veto 'mixed' treaties negotiated by the central government. In this approach, the interests of individual sub-states are given more weight than the collective will of the sub-states. 
Checks and balances
Bicameral systems, in both multi-tiered and unitary systems, are often justified as instruments of checks and balances: they reduce the concentration of power in one House, and confine executive's powers because two Houses are allegedly more difficult to manipulate (Trivelli 1974: 29) . In practice, the dilemma mentioned above made it difficult for Upper Houses to fulfil this task: if specific but not representative, they have no legitimacy for curbing decisions of the Lower Houses; if representative but not specific they will reach the same conclusions. The latter is especially the case in parliamentary systems, where the Executive emanates from the majority in Parliament.
This function, however, gains relevance in federal systems. As mentioned, federalism allows for the combination of specificity and representativeness. Moreover, the idea of curtailing government power is a basic principle on which federal theories are built (Burgess 2006: 35) , which explains the notable correlation of bicameralism and federal systems (Sharman 1987: 96) . Nonetheless, the function presupposes strong Upper Houses, which is more likely in presidential systems rather than parliamentary systems. Germany, 
Multinational conflict management
Multinational states are often divided. Any state contains groups that differentiate themselves through language, religion or ethnic background. In divided societies, however, Osoghae (1998: 210) this may be explained by the fear that strong multinational mechanisms reinforce identity awareness to the point that decentralist dynamics get out of hand.
Conclusion
While federalism and bicameralism are often correlated, Upper Houses are not essential for a federal system. More important is the function that is assigned to Upper Houses. In federal systems, the most common -but not necessarily exclusive -function is representation of territorial sub-entities. To fulfil this task, however, Upper Houses have to fulfil certain requirements that concern both composition and competences. Where these conditions are not fulfilled, alternative mechanisms may secure the involvement of substates in central decision making. Such mechanisms may favour the protection of individual sub-state interests over the protection of collective interests. In multinational states, the representation of national groups is vital for the survival of the system. Therefore, where national groups do not entirely match with territorial division, representation of national groups will have priority over representation of territorial sub-entities.
These findings will guide the discussion of the puzzle with which Section one of this paper concluded, and which is resumed in the following Section. The central position is that multinationalism explains why bicameralism is being gradually dismantled in Belgium, despite continuous decentralising dynamics.
The dismantling of the Belgian Senate as a symbol of multinational confederalism
Introduction
According to parliamentary documents, the main purpose of Senate reform was securing the involvement of the territorial sub-states (Parl.Doc. Senate 2011 -2012 , 5-1720 . This explains why -apart from the relic of co-opted senators -the Senate is composed of members of the sub-state assemblies. However, it neither explains the complexity of its rules of composition, nor its declining powers.
Confederalist aspirations, as a device for multinational conflict management, provide more insight in the peculiarities of the Belgian Senate. As mentioned above, in the search for an optimum between diversity and integrity, confederal systems prefer the maximisation of diversity. Belgium is a federal system with undeniable confederal traits, as federal decisions require the approval of the two major language groups: language parity in the federal government ensures that any government decision is approved by both special majority laws.
Multinationalism coincides with the delineation of sub-states, but only partially. The division of territorial Communities and Regions is complex, due to diverging views on whether the federal design should be Community-based or Region-based. The Walloons aspired for autonomy with regard to territory-based competences such as economic policy, whereas the Flemish demanded autonomy with regard to cultural and other language- At the heart, however, everything revolves around the two major language groups, the French and the Dutch. In what follows, I will demonstrate that 1) territorial representation must not interfere with power relations between the major language groups and 2) in accordance with confederalism, individual veto power was preferred over collective involvement.
Preference for language groups over territorial representation
The Senate is composed of MPs of the sub-national assemblies, yet the partitioning in two language groups has not been removed. The representation of the sub-states was not to interfere with the proportional share of each language group. Territorial representation threatened to do so, as there are more French-speaking sub-states compared to Dutchspeaking sub-states: on the Flemish side, because of the merger of the Community and Regional levels, there is only one sub-state entity, whereas on the francophone side, the On the Flemish side, this was relatively simple, since the Flemish Parliament is representative of both the Region and the Community. The only concern was to also involve the Dutch-speaking members of the Brussels Region. For the French-speaking side, the concern to find a compromise between 'regionalists' and 'communitarists', together with the involvement of the Brussels Region, resulted in more complexity.
Moreover, the division in language groups and the discussions per language group explain why, ultimately, the Brussels Region is not, as such, represented in the Senate. Instead, the language groups within the Parliament of the Brussels Region are represented. On the 
Preference for confederal over federal arrangements
Confederalism is mainly concerned with the preservation of autonomy of the entities in the confederation, that are considered equal within the confederal entity. Therefore, Still, one could wonder why the Upper House was not valued more in a combination with direct involvement. Indeed, the mechanism for direct involvement in the federal lawmaking procedure is far from effective: sub-states are not systematically informed of the bills and proposals handled by the Chamber of Representatives; and if negotiations do not lead to a compromise, the Chamber can resume the procedure. Consequently, confederalists would be expected to prefer the Chamber of sub-states over the Chamber of Representatives. However, in Belgium, the powers of the Chamber of Representatives have been strengthened to the detriment of the Senate.
The answer is that the Chamber of Representatives is not a federal chamber that represents the federal interests. It is composed of representatives of the two language communities, elected on lists adopted by regionally-based political parties, divided in two language groups, and constituting a majority to support a government that, in conformity with the constitution, is made up of an equal number of French-and Dutch-speaking ministers.
Consequently, where language group representation is preferred over territorial representation and confederalist decision making is preferred over the federalist, the Chamber of Representatives is the preferential chamber.
Conclusion
The research question was phrased as follows: 'how does the dismantling of the Belgian Senate fit in the increasingly devolutionary nature of the Belgian state structure?'.
Section 1 showed the gradual dismantling of the Senate: as it was turned into a more genuine chamber of the sub-states, it was deprived of most of its powers. Section 2 clarified the various functions of Upper Houses in multi-tiered systems, and the requirements regarding composition and competences needed to fulfil these functions. It highlighted that while bicameralism is the preferred institutional device for federal states, it is not essential. Section 3 applied this to the Belgian Senate. While, officially, the function of the Senate is territorial representation, it is imperfect as to composition and inadequate as to competences. It has no function in external relations, having lost its powers to give approval to international agreements. It is inadequate in its provision for checks and balances; the system has turned into a de facto unicameral one, except in important but exceptional institutional and constitutional matters. What remains is its function as management tool for multinational conflict. For this function, language group representation is preferred over sub-state representation. This explains the complex composition of the Senate, but also explains the preference for the Chamber of Representatives over the Senate.
Multinationalism-based confederalism, then, is the answer to the research question.
The transformation of the Senate into a Chamber of the sub-states turned out to be an inadequate effort to disguise how the Belgian state increasingly evolves towards confederalism based on two major linguistic groups.
 Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Antwerp. II Art. 56, 4° and 5° Constitution in the 1831 version. Originally, the Senators also had a mandate of 8 years instead of four. II Along with a large population, size and the presence of a stable democracy, i.e. the absence of a coup or
